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| SYMBOL OF PROTEST: File picture of Irom Sharmila on her hospital bed |
The Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act has always been an emotive issue for the people of the Northeast. The reason is because they have borne the brunt of this draconian legislation. This act enforced in those areas designated as “disturbed” in insurgency-affected areas of the Northeast gives impunity to security forces operating in the region.
Recently, while addressing the meeting of the police chiefs of the Northeast in Shillong, Meghalaya Governor R.S. Mooshahary reiterated what civil society had been doing for decades. The governor stated that the act was ineffective in dealing with insurgency. He said it should be withdrawn or put under suspension to test its efficacy or the lack of it.
The additional director, Intelligence Bureau, who was in Shillong to take part in the proceedings, was in complete agreement with Mooshahary. No policeman worth his salt would agree to such an outdated piece of legislation, the seeds of which were sown during the colonial regime.
As it is, even the Indian Police Act has not undergone much transformation since the British enacted it centuries ago. Despite repeated appeals from the police establishment for giving a human face to the Indian Police Manual, there are some forces that want the status quo to continue. Hence, we are enveloped in a mist of ambiguity.
Here we are living in a free country but guided by archaic laws and even more anachronistic lawkeepers bound by the shackles of a deeply hierarchical feudal structure. The police are right in wanting to guard their turf. Insurgency is an internal problem best handled by the police. For one, they are familiar with the grapevine and know exactly what is cooking where.
They will not open blind fire and allow non-combatants to get hurt during an operation. The reason is because the police are accountable for any act of impunity since they are not covered by the army act. But the army and paramilitary forces are accountable to none. The army act gives them complete immunity.
There are too many instances of violation of human rights by security forces in the Northeast. That such atrocities by state forces are protected by the army act negates the very idea of democracy. It is significant that the police chiefs of the Northeast, the army and paramilitary forces have got together to discuss the security scenario of the region amidst some plain talking in the presence of all concerned.
The additional director, IB, unequivocally pointed to the diminishing returns of continuing with army operations to tackle insurgency. He said that army operations tend to give an upper hand to insurgents because with every operation there are too many civilian casualties and other avoidable collateral damages.
A common experience within the region is that the small gains made by the police are often negated by an army operation gone awry. One of the setbacks to countering insurgency in the Northeast has been this constant dilemma about who is best placed to handle the situation — the army or the police?
Granted that militancy is not a normal law and order problem. But neither is it warfare. Military action to tackle militancy has, as pointed out by the IB official, proved counter-productive and as someone heading the intelligence network of the region, he should know what he is talking about.
It is a globally recognised fact that the state police play a critical role as the first line of defence against the threats of terrorism and insurgencies. An informative study by Report, Institute for Social Policy and Understanding (RAND) titled How Terrorist Groups End provides ample evidence that effective police and intelligence work, rather than the use of military force, deliver better counter-terrorism results. Based on this conclusion, the report suggested to US policymakers that they stop using the phrase “war on terrorism” because there is no battlefield solution to defeating terrorists.
Another valuable study analysing the police role in counter-insurgency campaigns in Malaya and Cyprus concluded that nearly all major 20th century counter-insurgency campaigns relied heavily on indigenous police. Kelev Sepp’s study titled Best Practices in Counter insurgency emphasises that the role of the police is crucial in successful counter insurgency measures. Sepp’s slogan for insurgency-hit areas is “police in the lead” with the military providing backup support and strengthening the police with diversified training capabilities to help meet the security needs of the at-risk population.
Having said that, the fact is that the police, too, have to revisit their objectives in the light of complex insurgency scenarios in the Northeast and their links to outfits inimical to the peace of this country. Much was spoken in the two-day conference about the jihadi threat from across the border and how such elements are finding a fertile ground in the Northeast. But it was agreed that this was at a nascent stage and could still be handled through a combination of good intelligence sharing and modern policing methods.
After the Mumbai blasts in November last year, there have been several comments on the weak intelligence gathering and the inability to convert the raw data into a coherent action plan normally termed as “actionable intelligence”. Different security agencies claim they had given enough warning of a possible terrorist attack from the sea but said such information was not acted upon by those in responsible positions. The death of a few police officers and men and a prominent officer of the National Security Guard had created a furore on the security lapses.
One year down the line we have almost forgotten November 26. This is perhaps our fatal flaw as a country. Paul Rosenberg and Jay Carafano, both experts in US law enforcement state that intelligence agencies often have solid, actionable intelligence about a terrorist threat but the information is not sufficient to secure a conviction under the existing criminal laws in that country.
Similar is the case with the UK and several other terrorism-affected countries.
The challenge lies in defining a legal regime in which actionable intelligence can be acted upon. Countries like India, therefore, need to develop a coherent structure of laws and procedures to deal with the interaction of intelligence information and the judicial system.
After a series of terror threats, the UK has developed legal structures that permit the government to act upon intelligence information (through preventive detention) while ensuring (through burden of proof standards, procedural protections and oversight) that civil liberties are not infringed upon. Preventive detention can only happen because of accurate intelligence. As a result, bombs planted at crucial points have been detonated by security forces, thus preventing largescale loss of human lives.
Insurgency and terrorism have been defined as two different phenomena. One is an internal problem the other an external threat. While each is to be dealt with differently, using distinct strategies, the fact remains that an alert police force and an effective intelligence network also require an operating space that is not constricted by anachronistic laws. While the act is strongly backed by the army on the plea that without it they cannot operate in insurgency-hit regions, the police, too, cannot operate effectively without a more nuanced legal system in place.
(The writer can be contacted at patricia17@rediffmail.com)