All the South Asian countries suffer from intra-state conflicts which sap their energy and eat into the vitals. Democratic and social institutions get affected, developmental activities suffer and effectiveness of the governance gets eroded. The problem in Jammu & Kashmir, Naxalism and the situation in Northeast India are some of the more prominent internal conflicts which need to be addressed seriously. In this context, the CSA had organised a lecture on 16th January 2009 by Mr Ved Marwah, Former Governor, Manipur and Jharkhand. His talk is reproduced here.
From every point of view, from economic to strategic, the Northeast is the most important region of the country. And yet, in national consciousness, the region figures more as the periphery of the country – an area that is both territorially and emotionally remote. This reality is sadly reflected also in the corridors of power in New Delhi. Therefore, not surprisingly, it remains as the most neglected part of the country. Over-burdened with all sorts of political, economic and security problems, the policy-makers have found little time for the Northeast. They refuse to learn any lesson from their past mistakes; and, in fact, continue making the same mistakes again and again. It is no secret that the allocated funds go into the pockets of unscrupulous politicians and bureaucrats and not to the target group; and yet every successive Prime Minister continues to announce an economic package for the region in the (unrealistic) hope that more funds is the answer to all the problems of the people. No thought is given to what happened to the previous such announcements?
Blessed by bountiful nature, the region is potentially the richest part of the country. And yet, it has remained poor and backward. It has huge natural resources. One-third of the country’s water resources are in the Northeast; it has the potential of generating thousand of megawatts of hydro-power. It has coal, oil and gas and one of the biggest unexploited sources of uranium in Meghalaya. It is also one of the most attractive regions of the country with so much pristine forest and bio-diversity. It has huge potential in horticulture and floriculture. Tea came to India through Assam. Its markets were, unlike now, well-connected to rest of the country and the world at large by rail, river and sea through Calcutta and Chittagong. The Northeast was a land of opportunity. That is why, people from various parts of the country flocked to the region to earn a better living. There was no dearth of investments; they flowed into the region from home and abroad. All this changed in 1947.
The many insurgencies and separatist movements flourishing in the area, pose the biggest challenge to the security establishment. The area is too large and the terrain too difficult to be pacified by force alone. A glance at the map would show how vulnerable this region is to both external and internal subversion. Ninety-nine percent of its borders are international borders; only one per cent are linked to the rest of the country through a narrow strip of land in Siliguri in the Darjeeling district of West Bengal, rightly called, the “Chicken Neck”. Hostile forces will always be tempted to squeeze India through the Siliguri Corridor, an area plagued with militancy and separatism. The adjacent countries have been less than friendly to India. The countries in the neighbourhood do not miss any opportunity to destabilize the situation to further their own agenda. Many insurgent groups operating in the Northeast have sanctuaries in Bangladesh and Myanmar. The big brother China is known to have supported the insurgent groups from Mizoram, Nagaland and Manipur. It has huge presence in Bangladesh and Myanmar. The recent developments in Tibet and a visible change in China’s attitude towards Arunachal Pradesh and Sikkim should be matter of serious concern. With the Maoists in the dominant role in the power structure in the new Nepal, we should not be surprised if they too become a player in this game, like Pakistan, Bangladesh and Myanmar. China will not have to send an invading army, as they did in 1962, to create trouble in this region. They can do so at the time of their choosing with more effect and least cost to itself through these “friendly countries”. Pakistan has been from the very beginning after independence active in this region in pursuit of its national agenda: the break-up of the Indian Union. Pakistan’s ISI is actively involved in supporting the insurgent groups. It has not given up hope of separating the Northeast from India. The spread of the “jehadi” ideology poses a new danger in the region. Bhutan cannot remain completely insulated from these revolutionary changes in Nepal. A change in the attitude of Bhutan towards this region to the disadvantage of India in the near future cannot be completely ruled out. But unfortunately, its strategic location has only created more problems for the people instead of rapid economic development. The dispersal of some ethnic groups to the neighbouring countries has created additional problems.
But the problem is basically political. A number of armed conflicts have been smouldering in the region since Independence. Reports of frequent killings do occasionally appear in the media, but seldom captures national attention for long enough time to make the people or the government in New Delhi to give serious thought to many problems of the region. The façade of democracy successfully hides the serious ills the region has been suffering for long. On the other hand militancy and endemic violence provide a convenient cover for what amounts to virtual loot of the public funds and the withdrawal of the state from even the most essential functions. The vacuum is being filled by the various insurgent groups. It is they who collect “taxes” in the form of extortion and provide security to their own ethnic group through their armed militias. The institutions of the state can neither guarantee security nor provide essential service. The sheer number of the many insurgencies thriving in the Northeast is staggering. Manipur tops the list with 36. Assam and Tripura are close second and third with 34 and 30 respectively. As ethnic loyalties get stronger and the armed militias tighten their stranglehold, the space for cooperation and obedience to the state institutions becomes more constricted. Since the state is no longer seen as a reliable instrument for providing security, the job is handed over to their own armed militia. The ground reality, that the Indian state is alien, remote and of little relevance to most inhabitants of this region, cannot be denied. It commands little loyalty among the people.
Unique Features of the Region
The region is so different from the rest of the country that it cannot be compared with any other part of the country. The people are different in every way - racially, ethnically and culturally. But they take great pride in their village, tribe and ethnic identity. The ethnic aspirations cannot be dismissed summarily as an outburst of emotive and irrational sentiments. The unending conflicts are reflected in breakdown of public order and the deterioration of inter-community relationships.
Far from being a homogeneous society, as commonly believed, it is a very diverse society with many races, religions and languages. The inhabitants of this region speak close to 160 languages. There are more than three hundred culturally distinct ethnic groups inhabiting the region. Whether it is linguistic practices, dress, rituals or food habits, there are vast differences among the various ethnic communities. They do not always share the same customs and traditions. Moreover, the cultural distance between the landowners in the plains and the hill people has produced wide cultural difference over the years, more so after independence. The land-owning plains people and the hill-tribes cannot be treated in the same way. Even though there are no clear-cut divisions, the erstwhile colonial rulers recognized this complex relationship. The hill-areas were much less administered than the plains area through much of colonial rule. Christian missionaries concentrated mainly in the hill-areas. Overwhelming majority- almost 90% - of the people in Mizoram, Nagaland, Mehalaya and the hills areas of Manipur are Christians.
History and geography have combined to make the people feel isolated and alienated from rest of the country. Deprived of even the most essential public services, they feel disgruntled and dissatisfied with the functioning of the government. Disgruntlement of the people may not be a unique feature of the Northeast, but there is a big difference. When people in rest of the country feel aggrieved and disgruntled, they vote out the incumbent government, but in the Northeast they blame the central government and start demanding separation from the Indian Union. The demand might not have been raised too seriously in the beginning, but falling prey to the separatist propaganda it soon becomes serious enough to give birth to militancy and insurgency.
Instead of giving special attention to economic and social development of the region, the central government followed the more convenient route since Independence of politically empowering the dominant ethnic group by creating tiny states on ethnic lines. The policy has increased and not lessened alienation. Political and economic empowerment must go hand in hand. One without the other has little meaning. The short-sighted policy made the minority ethnic groups more insecure and alienated than before. The unintended effect of this policy has been to give rise to many more demands for the division of even these tiny states and the creation of more states on ethnic lines. Division and sub-division along ethnic lines is no solution to the problem of alienation of the people. Prime Minister Nehru rightly understood the sensitivity of the region and its people but failed to appreciate the complexity of its social structure. The various arrangements devised in an ad hoc and short-sighted manner have failed to achieve the desired objective. They have, in fact, created new conflicts and demands for more division and fragmentation on ethnic lines.
A Society in Transition
Many important economic, political and social changes are taking place in the tribal society. The tribal communities are going through a process of transition from shifting cultivation to settled agriculture, from village control of land to private ownership. Changes in agrarian practices, urbanization and cultural transformation that are taking place due to the arrival of the electronic media have in their wake brought their own problems. One has also to recognize the numerous informal arrangements that have emerged in the ownership of land and business practices because of legal restrictions enforced in the region intended to safeguard the interests of the local people. The migrants who have gained considerable amount of economic and political power through informal means are now demanding formal change in the status of the land in their possession by giving them formal titles. The loss of land by the tribals to the migrants is one of the important causes in places like Karbi Anglong for ethnic conflicts and rise of insurgency. Problems of economic and social justice in the Northeast are more complex than what the ‘regime of protection’ designed by the colonial rulers was expected to accomplish.
The process of modernization has changed the way the younger generation thinks and acts. One consequence of this change has been that the elders no longer enjoy the status they used to enjoy earlier. The tribal society appears to be moving away from traditional values of egalitarianism for each and every member of the tribe to a no-hold-bar vicious form of feudal exploitation of the poor. Militancy, drug-trafficking, and large scale leakages from public funds have combined to create new oligarchy of politicians, government servants and government contractors who indulge in blatant corruption. They are flagrantly violating the most cherished values and work ethics of the tribal society. Exposure of the remote and isolated societies to greed and availability of easy money has brought out the worst among some of them. They have no shame or fear in openly manipulating and exploiting the situation for personal gain. The newly rich, expert in double-speak, are also in the forefront of campaigns of anti-India propaganda. They are primarily responsible for fueling the separatist fires in the region. Innocent tribal-people are generally uncomfortable with ‘outsiders’. They become easy prey to the vicious propaganda against them. Widespread corruption and dislike for manual labour are the direct consequences of this state of instability.
Militancy and Insurgency
In 2008, 1057 persons were killed, almost double as compared to 539 in J&K, in the terrorist related violence in the seven states in the north-east. The region has registered a sharp rise in the terrorist violence in the last few years. The number of deaths has increased from 640 in 2006 to 1057 in 2008.The two worst-affected states are Manipur and Assam. 500 persons were killed in Manipur and 372 in Assam in 2008. An estimated two lakh persons are reported to be internally displaced due to ethnic strife.
The Naga insurgency was the first armed conflict in this region. It started soon after India’s independence in 1947 when the Naga leadership under Z.A.Phizo raised its banner of revolt. Since then the number of armed conflicts has multiplied. From one Naga insurgency at the time of independence in 1947, the number of insurgencies has multiplied to over hundred spread all over the region. There are reports of insurgents regrouping, forging national and international alliances, taking direct help from intelligence agencies of countries hostile to India, extorting huge funds, buying of sophisticated arms and explosives in the international arms market, including weapons like rocket launchers and remote control electronic devices.
The Nagas were the first to raise the separatist flag. The British did not discourage their ambition for a separate state. In fact, there is enough evidence to show that they actively encouraged it, because they did not trust new rulers in India, who had fought a long struggle for independence against the British. According to their assessment then, the British interests would be safer in the hands of the Naga leaders. Aware of danger to India’s integrity and security, Prime Minister Nehru took a number of steps to win their loyalty and meet their aspirations for separate identity. The division of Assam into tiny states on ethnic lines became the main plank of his policy. With hind sight one can say that this was the beginning of trouble in the region. Once the central leadership allowed identity politics to play a free role, it was only a matter of time before the other ethnic groups started demanding their own separate states. Having started the process, the central government could not reverse it. It is still going on! Militancy and insurgency confined to the Naga area soon spread to other parts of the region.
The pattern of insurgency has followed the conventional guerilla warfare pattern by committing acts like ambushes, target killings and selective hitting of soft targets, like alleged police informers, contractors, and political collaborators to create fear and panic. Till the end of 1970’s, as insurgency was confined to a limited area, only two or three ethnic groups were involved. This number has proliferated since then, and today the region is afflicted by over hundred insurgencies. The many insurgencies that are flourishing in the region include the insurgencies by the Nagas, Mizos, Tripura tribes, Meities, ULFA, Karbis, Khasis, Garos in the hills, and the Bodos, Kacharis, Tiwas, Rabhas, Misings, Ahoms, Chautias, Deuries, Kosch, Rajanshis, Moran, Matak and by the Meiteis in the plains.
Many of them are the result of inter-ethnic conflicts. They include, Bodos and Santhals, the Kouch Rajbonshi and Bodos, Karbi and Kukis, Kukis and Nagas, Khasis and Jaintias and Garos, Dimsas and Hmars in Barak Valley, Tripuris and Bengalis, Mizos and Reangs, Chakmas and Aruncahalis, Khamti and Mishimees. These are some of the more serious conflicts raging in the region. One factor that is fueling insurgencies in the region is that most political and economic benefits are being cornered by the dominant ethnic group. This is creating insecurity and tensions among the minority groups in a region afflicted by scarcity of opportunities and resources. These insecurities and tensions have led to demands for secession, separate homeland, and ethnic cleansing. The smaller communities not being in a position to influence the outcome of political verdict are pushed to the background. They find themselves pushed to the margins of the political and economic system. The local elite exploit the situation for their own selfish ends. They assume the leadership to mobilize the people against the state and the rival ethnic groups and push them towards militancy. The insurgent groups have close links with mainstream politicians of their own ethnic group. Ethnic politics could well be the other side of the incapacity of the state to guarantee security of life and property. Security is provided by their ethnic armed militias.
Whatever the genesis of insurgency, the dynamics of its persistence has acquired a momentum of its own. The collusive arrangement between different militant factions and the various political parties and civil servants are more the norm than the exception. The nexus has helped in building a massive network of extortion and intimidation. The extremist politics have more than one component. Their demand for separate political identity and ethno-centric demands are an integral part of their political agenda. The obvious conflict of interest over land, government jobs, and cultural and ethnic identity have only further complicated and aggravated the situation. The ambitious political and economic elite manipulate these conflicts to mobilize mass movements.
Many of the ethnic communities demand separation from the Indian union; they demand a separate sovereign state for their own ethnic community. They have crossed the stage of ethnicity into the stage of nation formation. The communities that are making secessionist demands include, the Asomiyas, Khasis, Bodos, Mizos, Nagas and even Karbis. It is also true that the demand for secession in the initial stages of these movements is more a bargaining tactic than a genuine demand by the insurgents. History of ethnic assertion is closely linked to the history of political evolution and the emergence of new social forces. Without the numbers and political clout, ambitious politicians, not unlike in the other parts of the country, use emotive issues and slogans to whip up public support.
The movements for secession, statehood, and autonomy can be divided into various categories: discrimination by the dominant communities; concern with issues of culture and language – attempts at assimilation or ethnic cleansing through the imposition of the language of the dominating community- like the Bodos and Bengalis in Assam; against outsiders, like in Tripura and Arunachal Pradesh; against other indigenous people like in Karbi-Kuki, Dimasa-Hmar, Naga-Kuki, Kuki-Paite, Reang-Mizo and Hmar Mizo conflict.
Lack of development is, no doubt, a serious problem, but the root cause of insurgency and the growing strength of secessionist sentiments lie in the deeply-rooted grievances relating to how states like Manipur and Nagaland were deprived of their political rights during the post-independence period. The insurgent groups, political parties, and public at large do complain about lack of development, but they put the entire blame for these conditions on the Union government. No solution can emerge and the situation would continue to deteriorate unless this hard reality is squarely faced.
But as insurgency is forced to confront the state, it is compelled out of necessity to seek sanctuaries and material support from the external sources, especially the neighbouring states hostile to India. And once they become dependent on the foreign governments for survival, it does not take long before the movements makes a strategic shift from the issues and demands that had made them relevant in the first place. While the core issues remain unresolved, the conflict continues to escalate. At times, the issues that had given birth to the movement and the later issues all get so mixed up and complicated that neither the movement leaders nor the representatives of the state are in a position to talk to each other to reach a compromise for fear of annoying and losing the support of one constituent of their support base or the other. The negotiations are then mainly conducted through the media and the intelligence agencies. The two are not the best interlocutors, because many a times they have their own agendas to pursue.
While the factors that are responsible for the rise of armed conflicts in various states in the north-east are not the same; the region shares some common problems.
Lack of Development
The region is the most underdeveloped part of the country. The partition of India in 1947 has played havoc with the economy of the region. It virtually made the region land-locked. It cut off its old routes of communication - land, rail and river - with the rest of the country, as they all pass through the then East Pakistan and now Bangladesh. One direct effect of this physical isolation is that the prices of even essential commodities are very high in the Northeast. The region produces relatively little even to meet its basic needs. The prices of goods and services are well above the rest of the country because of high cost of transportation.
Many items of fruits like oranges which grow in abundance in some parts of the region rot because there are no cold storages or warehouses. Banking services continue to be of primitive standards. Lack of development is one of the major reasons for alienation of the people. Alienation has led to conflict and violence, which in turn has become the biggest stumbling block in the path of development.
Poorly-educated, young men and women in the region have a dislike for manual labour; they want white collar jobs in government service as there are no jobs in the private sector. In the prevailing environment of insecurity, very little private investments are coming into Northeast. The huge expansion of civil services that has taken place in recent years has resulted in corruption, nepotism and incurrence of large unproductive public expenditure. Lack of infrastructure, like roads, transport and power, has discouraged industrial development in the region.
Unemployment
Government service or becoming a government contractor is the two main options for earning easy money. It is, therefore, not surprising that there is ever increasing demand for more central government funds and government jobs in these financially non-viable tiny states. Ever-increasing government machinery has become a white elephant for the state economy.
Financially Unviable ‘Tiny Sates”
At the time of independence the north-east region comprised of Assam and two princely states of Manipur and Tripura. But in common parlance the whole region was known as Assam. The name Northeast gained currency only after the reorganization of the region and liberation of Bangladesh. Till then the whole area, except the area that constituted the then Naga Hills, was peaceful. Prior to 1947 no ethnic group, except the Naga National Council (NNC) demanded secession from the Indian Union. The situation has undergone a dramatic change for worse since then.
The reasons for the division of Assam and the creation of new states were entirely political. Political expediency rather than in-depth thinking decided a very complex issue in a simplistic manner in the hope that the creation of new states will put an end to turmoil and secessionist demands. But instead of bringing peace and development to the region, this one step is responsible for creating more problems than any other. It has fueled more militant demands for the creation of more autonomous units or separate states on the basis of ethnic numbers or secession from the Indian Union.
With the exception of Assam, all other states are too small and lack resources to become financially self-reliant. Their dependence on the central government even to run the state administrative machinery is total. Pumping in more funds for development, instead of leading to faster development has only bolstered “patronage politics”. Securing maximum funds from the central government becomes the main task of the elected government. For this obvious reason, the ruling party at the Center finds it easier to manipulate politics in the states to foist its own party government on the people in the state. It is not a coincidence that more often than not, each time there is a change in the party ruling at the centre, there is a corresponding change in the party ruling in most states of the region. Voting pattern suggests a bias in favour of the party ruling at the centre.
Poor Governance
The erstwhile colonial rulers recognized the complex relationship between the hills and the plains-people. The hill-area was much less administered than the plains area. The British had realized the difficulties of directly ruling this region. Isolated by geography, rugged terrain and forests, the policy of colonial neglect continued by the post-independence Indian rulers have all combined to keep the region backward. It continues to remain an isolated and neglected part of the country. The British had by design segregated the area into various categories: regulated areas, scheduled districts, backward tracts and partially or excluded areas. Ostensibly for security reasons, an Inner Line was drawn to prevent tribal raids into the plains, though later it was maintained with the objective of protecting the hill people from exploitation of the plainsmen. The irony is that it is the plains people, in states like Manipur, who today demand its introduction in their states to keep the hated “outsider” – the people from the rest of the country. The Mizos are today agitating for the retention of the “Inner Line”, so are the Nagas. The British had left the area mostly un-administered except where they had their own economic interests. They had drawn an Inner Line in 1873, ostensibly to protect the tribal interests, but kept pushing it out to accommodate their own interests in the newer tea gardens. They also created Kuki settlements in the Naga dominated areas for protection against raids by the Naga predators. But they generally treated these areas as un-administered.
After independence, the Indian government took a more direct interest in the region. The Indian Frontier Administrative Service was created in 1956 for better administration of this border region by a specially selected cadre of officers drawn from various streams. The service, however, was merged with the Indian Administrative Service (IAS) in 1970 for no valid reasons. The north-eastern states were divided into more than one cadre. The ill-conceived step has made the task of improving the administration even more difficult. The All India Service officers from outside the region are reluctant to get posted to the Northeast. No matter how much security and financial incentives are provided to the officials from outside, they treat assignments here as punishment and hardship postings. They can hardly be expected to build a sort of rapport with the people that can be foundation of a normal legitimate state. The officers from outside the region are unable to adjust to tribal life and have become social and psychological misfits.
The newly created Department of Northeast Economic Development has failed to take off, because lack of coordination between the Union Home ministry and the department. It is functioning more like a branch of the Planning Commission distributing funds and approving development projects. Not surprisingly, the department has inherited all the shortcomings of the planning Commission. A former DONED Minister was accused of being India’s Mr. “Ten Percent”. 10% of the total cost for the projects cleared by the DONED had to be paid to the son of the minister, it was alleged. It must be recognized that it is not possible to separate politics, security and economic development in the region. The so-called “Look East Policy” too has failed to take off. The policy has little relevance to the states in the Northeast till the problems of infrastructure and security can be solved. The sad reality is that writ of the governments in the insurgency-affected states simply does not run. Despite all this talk about rapidly improving the infrastructure, the situation on the ground is pathetic even after over sixty years of independence. Even some national highways are becoming increasingly non-functional. The region having the largest resources of water and power is abysmally short of power and water. Health services and the education system are in shambles. Most schools exist only on paper, and the higher educational institutions are a disgrace. Even the so-called central universities are centres for distribution of patronage and not for imparting quality education. Despite pumping in the highest per capita development funds, the gap between the region and the rest of the country is actually widening and not narrowing.
The three main wings of the Union Government who deal with the Northeast– Planning Commission, the Union Home Ministry and the newly created Department for the Northeast under a separate Minister- all suffer from the same misconception. The North East Council too is no longer the institution it used to be. It has been functioning more like the Planning Commission in New Delhi as a funding agency. It suffers from all the shortcomings that such institutions suffer from. It is being manipulated by corrupt politicians and bureaucrats to serve their own ends. The institution was supposed to look at the development of the region, comprising tiny states, as a whole. Though based in the region it is too bereft of any vision for the development of this troubled region. It is being pulled in different directions for allocation of funds by greedy and corrupt local political leaders. Central funds instead of making any significant contribution to economic and social development have added to nepotism and corruption. Simplistic view of the many complex issues has only made the situation more difficult.
Corruption and Extortion
A fixed percentage of government employees salaries are deducted, generally at source, by the insurgent groups. Similarly, no contract for construction or supply of goods and services can be signed without the approval from the insurgent group. They have their own list of favourite contractors, who pay a percentage of payment received from the government to them. There have been many instances, where the civil servant unwilling to meet the extortionist demands, were forced to sign on the dotted line at gun- point. In a number of reported cases, the reluctant officers have been punished. Some of them were shot in the leg and even killed in their own office if still not complying with their instructions. Politicians and bureaucrats are expected to share part of the ill-gotten money acquired by them by virtue of their official position with the insurgents and their supporters. Line separating militants from non-militants is often blurred. This ground reality explains the so-called nexus between armed militias, mainstream politicians and bureaucrats.
There are hardly any checks on misappropriating government funds. The audit department exists only in name. The officers posted in the department are too scared to make even pretence of audit.
Corruption has also distorted the political system. The story of Samata Party forming the government in Manipur in 2001 illustrates the state of politics in the state. In the 2000 assembly elections, the Samata Party was able to get only one of their candidates elected. Unfortunately, even he died within few months of his election and the Party had no presence in the State Assembly. And yet in 2001, it managed to form the government. Political leadership in Delhi is no less responsible for the mess in the Northeast as amoral and corrupt leadership in these states. The mainstream national political parties vie with each other to install their own party government in these states. For obvious reasons, the ruling party at the centre has an advantage over the other parties. It controls the purse strings! The question is why are the central leaders so keen on foisting their own party government on the hapless people of the state, when they are fully aware that their party has little grass-root support and has a very narrow base to grow. I was told by more than one state leader that adding another state to their tally of state governments ruled by their state is not the only reason. They make open allegations about the payment “levy” to their high commands in Delhi. True or not, it explains the nastiness in the state of politics in the Northeast.
The militants and other anti-national forces take full advantage of this state of affairs and subvert the security system. In some states like Manipur the militants exercise such strong control over the administration that not many dare to disobey their commands. The system of extortion is well-orgnaised. Trouble arises only when more than one militant organization is involved in the extortion racket. There have been cases where the militants have entered into the so-called well-protected government office of the government servants unable to meet their demands and shoot them.
Politics in the Northeast are not based on democratic norms as understood in the western-model democratic system. The democratic system which they practice is very different from this model. Though in one sense the tribal societies are truly democratic; they have characteristics of a strong cohesive community in which every member of the tribe lives and works for the entire tribe. The rise of corrupt, greedy and power-hungry elite is more the product of the distortion of the Indian democratic system as practiced here. Concept of private property is relatively new in these areas. The economic structure was relatively simple. Every one in the tribe and the village contributed one’s bit in fighting the tough battle of survival. The village was a self-sufficient unit. The traditional system of ‘gaon bara’ tells its own story. This traditional system exists even today in Nagaland and some other areas. However, it has lost much of its shine. There has been steady erosion of this once strong institution due to many factors; the most important being its virtual replacement with the so-called modern democratic institutions.
The duality in the administrative and political system has also created serious problems. The formal structure has all the trappings of the modern system, but lacks substance. The concept of rule of law on which all the democratic institutions rest is very different in the tribal societies. All functionaries of the government are expected to favour their own tribe members and not members of other tribes even in doing so they violate the “rule of law”. The members of their own tribe are more equal than the others. Every one is not equal before the law as understood in these societies. Outsiders will remain as outsiders even if they have lived in the area for centuries. Political leaders and civil servant are expected to discriminate in favour of the tribe. It is in this context one has to understand the misappropriation of public funds. In fact, looting ‘Indian money’ is considered as the right thing to do. Corruption if practiced to benefit their tribe is not looked down upon. It has social sanction as long as the loot is shared with the tribe.
Politician-Insurgent Nexus
Political party is a key institution in a parliamentary democracy. In the Northeast this institution is very weak. Political party label means very little in this region, except in Assam and Tripura, as compared to the rest of country. Most political parties do not have any organized structure. They have no ideology, and political leaders shamelessly manipulate the system for personal gain. They hop from one party to the other without any compunction or fear of criticism from the people. They are able to retain their support, and even increase it, if they can distribute loaves and fishes to them.
As money is the name of the game, most political leaders find it convenient to develop close associations with one insurgent group or the other. During elections political leaders seek support of the insurgents in the form of muscle power. They also depend on them for emotional appeal to the electorate on ethnic lines. In lieu of their support, they share part of the loot from public funds with them and intervene with the state police in their favour. The growing nexus between the undergrounds and the over ground political leaders and the civil servants is directly related to the lure for easy money. As the people do not trust the state police to protect them, the different ethnic groups have organized their own armed militias. They need funds to maintain these armed, which they secure by extortion and pilferage of government funds practiced on large scale. This in turn has led to a breed of greedy political leaders whose main interest in politics is to make money and not serve the people. The entire political system in the region has grown around these unscrupulous politicians. The system enriches the corrupt leaders and civil servants.
With the politician-contractor- insurgent nexus getting stronger with passage of time, the state governments in insurgency-affected areas are virtually non-functional. They rule the small area in the capital and, may be, the district headquarters. The various insurgent groups have filled this vacuum without much difficulty and resistance. Many of the contractors turned politicians are simply not interested in development to provide even the most basic essential services to the people.
Another factor with strong negative influence on the electorate is small size of the constituencies. As the number of electorate in most constituencies in the region is small and the number of candidates seeking elections large, it is possible to win elections by getting support from a small section of the electorate; sometimes as low as 10% of the total votes in that constituency. Therefore, to win election, the candidates do not have to woo the entire electorate; they concentrate on a small core support group, mostly from their own ethnic group. Distribution of cash to win support is not looked down upon. Because the size of the legislature is small, the support of even one MLA assumes great importance in the formation of the government. One or two member parties do brisk business during the period of government formation. They negotiate hard for their support; it is given to the highest bidder.
The region sends very few members of Parliament, only eight for the Lok Sabha. Without political and economic weight it finds it difficult to get national attention except when there is a crisis situation like large scale violence. Militancy, insurgency and sensational incidents of violence have become integrated part of political strategy to grab national attention and to put pressure on the central government to attend to their many grievances, real and imaginary. All these constraints make political management of this sensitive region difficult and complicated.
Immigration
Demographic change in Assam took place due to deliberate policy of the British to bring in Bengalis as civil servants and Santhalis as tea-plantation workers, and Nepalis in the police and paramilitary forces. The problem of migration dates back to the colonial period. Causes for migration are complex. During the colonial period, large-scale migration from other parts of the country took place because of economic reasons and administrative preferences. After partition, in addition to economic factors, large-scale migration took place also because of security and political reasons. The policy-makers have not always been sensitive to this complexity. Large scale influx of the Bengalis from East Pakistan was strongly resented by the local tribal people, as the migrants had converted them into a minority in their own land. Violent tribal-non tribal conflict and insurgency in Tripura were the direct consequence of this unchecked and later legalized immigration.
Internal conflict-induced displacements in the region have further complicated the problem. Among the recent conflict-induced displacements in the Northeast are Paites, Kukis and Nagas in Manipur; Reangs in Mizoram, Bengalis and various Tripuri tribes in Tripura; and Chakmas in Arunachal Pradesh. Kukis in Manipur demand the creation of a separate Sadar Hill District (Kangpokpi). Mounting tensions between the historically ethnic area and the contemporary demographic reality of overlapping ethnicity has fueled many conflicts. The influx into the Northeast has created communal, linguistic, and even tribal-non tribal conflicts. These have been exploited by vested interests for petty partisan political ends, unmindful of larger consequences for national security. They have given rise to suspicion, violence and even ethnic-cleansing.
Drug Traffic
Proximity to the “Golden Triangle”, notorious for drug trafficking, has led to growth of organized crime in the region. Drug-traffickers have close links with political leaders and bureaucrats. Drug traffickers are using Mizoram, Manipur and Nagaland as a transhipment point as well as a market. The number of drug addicts is growing rapidly in these states. The incidence of drug abuse and AIDS in Manipur is one of the highest in the country.
Changing Situation
As the ULFA came under pressure from the security forces, it made a dramatic turn around and instead of demanding the ouster of illegal migrants from Bangladesh its top leaders have sought shelter in Bangladesh. They depend on the aid from the Bangladesh and Pakistan intelligence agencies for the very survival of their separatist movement. Today, they are running training camps in Bangladesh, the country from where the illegal immigrants in large numbers had come. Their top leaders have been provided sanctuary in Bangladesh by the Bangladesh government. It is, therefore, not surprising that they almost have given up their earlier demand of throwing out the Bangladesh immigrants and are today pursuing the Bangladesh Directorate General of Forces Intelligence (DGFI) agenda of targeting the migrants from other parts of India. It is today advocating recognition of the contribution of the illegal immigrants from Bangladesh to Assam’s economy. The outfit has also maintained some camps in Myanmar. It had earlier camps also in the forests of Bhutan, but they were ousted from there by the Bhutanese army in a military operation. Assam has 265 km of border with Bhutan.
The demand by a section of the Muslims which has sought OBC status in Assam has created further complication. All these trends show how far the Assamese society has fragmented since the beginning of the fragmentation process. They have fueled discontent and a sense of deprivation that has led to demand for distinct classification in order to secure reservation benefits in jobs and other entitlements, autonomy, separate statehood and even secession. Its initial demand was for an autonomous district, but ABSU has now pitched for a Union Territory status. The very notion of one Assamese people is being seriously challenged by the Bodos, Karbis and other tribal groups. They feel oppressed and discriminated against and demand separation from Assam and not from the Indian Union, though lately secessionist demands are also being articulated by the hardliners among them.
Inter-Ethnic conflicts
Hmar-Dimasa and Kuki-Karbi clashes in Karbi Anglong and consequent exodus of Khasi-Pnars from Karbi-Anglong led to further conflict and violence. Many of the insurgencies grew out of inter-ethnic conflicts. They have spread to the neighbouring states where their ethnic groups are in sizable numbers, for example, Naga groups presence in Changlang and Tirap districts in Arunachal Pradesh. Ethnic groups based in Tripura and Manipur such as Reangs, Brus and Hmars and have both physical and political presence in Mizoram. A large number of these groups have been militarized as well as politicized. Ethnic militias have become part of the civil societies because of feeling of insecurity vis-a-vis other ethnic groups. They are fighting battles on two fronts, one against the other hostile ethnic group and the other against the Indian state, though not all demand secession from the Indian Union.
The demand for a separate homeland for the Bodos has generated strong opposition from the non-Bodo groups, many of whom are no less disadvantaged than the Bodos. In this complex ethnic scenario, some disadvantaged groups are demanding schedule tribe status for their community as they feel doubly deprived and disadvantaged in order to be able to enjoy the basic citizenship rights. Some of these groups have been living here for centuries and have no other home to go to if forced to leave from here. The ULFA have started a violent campaign for the ouster of these communities from Assam. The proliferation of ethnic agendas, ethnic militias and ethnic violence are the result of misconceived short term solutions to complex issues which demand an integrated approach for solving the problems on long term basis. The farce of dialogue with the ULFA leaders through the interlocutors from the civil society has only strengthened the ULFA, who after their ouster from the sanctuaries in Bhutan had been considerably weakened. It is unfortunate that narrow political interests and not national interest continue to dictate government policies.
Another illustration of how sensitive various ethnic groups are about their ethnic identity is the Zomi-Kuki conflict. Their conflict is over the trivial issue of nomenclature. But it was not less bloody! The Paite-Zomis and Thadeu-Kukis conflicts took as many 562 lives (342 Zomis and 22 Kukis) in 1997. The situation, however, has not remained static. They keep on changing their demands and allies. The ULFA and the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) seek protection and sanctuary in Bangladesh, a country whose people they had earlier sought to kill and deport from Assam.
Religious tensions in Assam are also on the increase. The rise of the communal forces in the state does not augur well for peace and stability in the state. The attempt to mobilize the Muslims in favour of the Congress party has not worked according to the plan. Distrustful of the Congress party’s motives, they have formed their own party in the hope of playing the balancing role in the tussle of power between the main contenders.
External Dimension
Situated in a troubled neighbourhood that is afflicted with all sorts of serious political conflicts, the Northeast cannot remain insulated from the repercussion of these conflicts. Dispersal of some ethnic groups across the international borders in the neighbouring countries like Nagas into Myanmar, and Chakmas into Bangladesh has created further complications that have serious implications for India’s national security. Some of the insurgent groups operating in this region like NSCN (K), UNLF and ULFA have sanctuaries in Myanmar and Bangladesh.
Proximity to international borders is a crucial factor helping the growth of militancy and insurgency in the region. Many insurgent movements are being supported by external intelligence agencies. The external threat is not something new and is manifest in the continuous cycle of violence and terror in the north-eastern states over the past several years. The presence of the ‘jihadi’ groups in the region is of recent origin. Islamic outfits, aided and abetted by Pakistan and Bangladesh are active in parts where there is sizable Muslim population, for example in parts of lower Assam where large number of illegal Bangladeshi migrants are living. The Directorate General of Forces Intelligence (DGFI) of Bangladesh and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan are active in fomenting trouble. Many of the insurgent groups in the Northeast are operating from their bases in Bangladesh. Several of their top leaders are openly living in Bangladesh. Bangladesh has all along denied the presence of Indian insurgents or their camps on its soil at the official level.
The Indian government is in possession of hard evidence about the role of Pakistan’s ISI and Bangladesh DGFI in the region. While Pakistan is driven by its obsession to avenge the separation of Bangladesh, the DGFI is furthering national agenda of ‘Greater Bangladesh”. They are making determined efforts to radicalize the Muslims population in the region. The simmering discontent in the region for one reason or the other provides them with the opportunity to do so. Though at one time China was providing training and arms to some of the major groups like the UNLF from Manipur and the Nagas, but since the late seventies there are no reports of its direct support. However, this could change with India-China relations taking a turn for the worse. In any case with its close allies Pakistan, Bangladesh becoming much more active in the region, it can outsource the task to these countries.
The top leadership of the ULFA has been given sanctuaries in Bangladesh. Some of them are living in the capital Dacca and allowed to carry on their activities with the help of the Bangladesh military and intelligence. The help to the insurgent groups did not stop even during the friendly regimes of Sheikh Mujib and his daughter Sheikh Hasina. Bangladeshi leadership cutting across party lines harbour the same ambition of separating the Northeast from the Indian Union. The sentiments are not very different in Nepal. All players in the political game, the former King, political parties and the Maoists are one in their opposition to India on many issues.
Political instability in the neighbourhood and the growth of the jehadi terrorist groups has a direct bearing on the situation in the Northeast. The recent spurt in acts of terrorism, including suicide bombings, something that was not witnessed earlier, is attributed to this phenomenon in our neighbourhood. Increasing involvement of Pakistan’s ISI and strengthening of the fundamentalist Islamic forces in this region should be matters of serious concern for national security. Leaders like ULFA’s Paresh Brua continue to enjoy the hospitality of Bangladesh even under the new military dispensation. There are recent reports about the closer working relationship between the ISI and the Bangladesh Intelligence agencies to strengthen these insurgent groups through greater financial help and bringing about closer working relationship between them and the new jehadi forces now getting stronger with help from Bangladesh in Pakistan. The first ever suicide bombing in Assam took place on 9 April 2007, which clearly points to the success of the Pakistani and Bangladesh intelligence agencies in the Northeast. It is reported that the number of training camps to train insurgent groups operating from this safe haven has gone up to 176. The ULFA leads the list with the highest number of training camps-38 within this terror belt which stretches form Sherpur district in the north, bordering the West Garo Hills in Meghalaya to Cox’s Bazaar in the south near Myanmar. Similarly, the National Liberation Front of Tripura (Biswamohan) has reportedly 34 camps spread along the Bangladesh-Tripura border in the three districts of Rangamati, Maulvi Bazar and Khagrachari and one at Dhanmandi in Dhaka. The All Tripura Tiger Force also has 15 camps in the same belt. Also listed in the report are the location of camps of Borok National Council of Tripura and Bru National Liberation Front in the Rangamati district. The National Democratic Front of Bodoland has 14 camps, Dima Hlam Daogarh of NC Hills district of Assam has one camp in Maulvi Bazar, Meghalaya’s Hyniewtrep National Liberation Council has two, the People’s Liberation Army of Manipur has sixteen, Kongeiyawal Kamba Lup has three, the United National Liberation Front has one, People’s Revolutionary Front of Kangliepak one, all from Manipur, Kamatapur Liberation Organisation eight, Muslim United Liberation Tigers of Assam 11 and Islamic United Reformation Protest of India has three camps reportedly located in the madrassas in Kurigram district.
Cachar, North Cachar Hills, Karbi Anglong and Meghalaya have seen a spurt in insurgency in the last few years, as the area straddles the transit route to Bangladesh. Pakistan’s active role in stoking the secessionist fires by providing material and financial help and ideological motivation. The ISI has been pursuing their agenda through the Islamic religious institutions in Bangladesh, Nepal. Bangladesh has been actively helping the insurgent groups by providing sanctuaries, training, funds, arms and explosives. The anti-India rhetoric also helps in shifting the focus of public wrath against the government for its failures to the bigger neighbour. The failure of the Indian government in solving the boundary disputes for the last thirty-six years has added to the problem.
Nothing hurts the people more than the belief that New Delhi is simply not bothered about what happens in the Northeast. How can total indifference of the central government be explained to the people in Manipur when the All Naga Students Association forced an economic blockade in 2006 that cut off all essential supplies to the state for fifty-two days? New Delhi did not intervene to end the blockade. Could it have allowed such a blockade even for one day say from Haryana to Delhi? The national media was as indifferent as the central government. Such instances only confirm their belief about the indifference of mainland India. Should we then be surprised if the secessionist forces are gaining strength?
Counterinsurgency Strategy
Unfortunately, government response has been piecemeal and ad hoc. It has not been able to formulate a long term and comprehensive strategy to deal with the problem. This is the main reason why neither military means, nor peace talks or ceasefire agreements have succeeded in bringing peace in the Northeast. Ad hoc policies have only exacerbated the problem. The fact that so far the only peace accord that has succeeded is the Mizoram accord with Ladenga in 1986 is because the sporadic negotiations with the militants were more an ad hoc response than an essential component of a long term comprehensive strategy. An essential requirement of a successful peace dialogue is that it manages to bring the major parties to the dispute, if not all groups, on board. This, the government failed to do in most such dialogues, including the protracted ceasefire and peace dialogue with the NSCN (IM). The ceasefire has not brought peace, also because its terms have been allowed to be blatantly violated by the NSCN (IM) cadres.
The government has also made efforts to accelerate the pace of development by allocating large funds to all the states in the northeast. The strategy has failed because development and security cannot be separated. Security and development are closely inter-twined. They are two faces of the same coin and one cannot be separated from the other. When in large parts of the Northeast the state is unable to perform its most basic functions, like maintenance of law and order, delivery of essential services and collect taxes, it would be unreal to expect any meaningful development. To plan development policies without taking into consideration the security situation on the ground would be unrealistic. It is not possible to get results unless the instruments of planning and implementing economic, political and security policies are combined in one institution of the state. The three cannot be separated; each has both short term and long term impact on the others. The North East Council which started with much fanfare in the seventies has not achieved much success because of this impractical division between economic, political and security policies. It has not made much impact even on the extremely slow pace of development of the region, as no development project can take off without creating a reasonable security environment.
The so-called “Look East Policy” announced with much fanfare has made no headway. There is very little trade with the neighbouring countries though the land route primarily because of conditions of insecurity on the Indian side. It also must be recognized that land routes are much more difficult and expensive than sea-routes. Most of the international trade in this region continues to be conducted through the sea-route.
The situation can still be managed if there is consensus among the main political parties about how to deal with it. Further illegal migration can be stopped and a solution found for the migrants who are already in the state for economic reasons. Granting work permits to them that will give them permission to work but no political rights, is one such solution. Creating one or more non-territorial constituencies for all non-locals could be another solution for granting them political rights. Article 171 of the Indian Constitution provides for doing this. Granting them legal status will not only foster regional and national solidarity but also improve the security situation. The suggestion that immigration due to economic and social distress, aggravated by natural disasters, can be countered by regulating legitimate labour movements through work-permits needs serious consideration.
A series of inter-related initiatives could point the way to understanding the requirements for peace and development. Any further drift and pouring funds into bottomless pit that do not reach the target group will only lead to further deterioration in the situation. The many serious issues need to be squarely faced and not evaded and swept under the carpet. The feeling of deprivation, real or imaginary, will only lead to further alienation and assertion of identity. Pandering to unreasonable demands will also worsen the situation. The policy-makers have still not learnt the lesson from the past experience. Giving in to demands for separation and autonomy on ethnic lines, and thus causing further fragmentation, are remedies worse than the disease. And yet the unending process of fragmentation is still on because of narrow political consideration.
The state police in the Northeast needs immediate attention from the central government if they are to perform effectively their role of enforcing the rule of law and providing protection of life and property. Postings in the Northeast should not be treated as punishment postings.
Deals negotiated in secrecy with one insurgent group or the other, however strong, like negotiations with the NSCN (IM), are unlikely to bring peace to this troubled region. The demands like Nagalim (greater Nagaland) are best addressed by creating a space in which all the stakeholders in these conflicts can express their views and meet their aspirations. The people of the region must be taken into confidence, if lasting solution to the divergent claims of various ethnic communities is to be resolved peacefully. Sixty years is a long enough a period for honest stock-taking and reassessment of the strategies and policies pursued so far. The fact that we have so far failed in achieving the aims and objectives cannot be denied.
In conclusion, it is suggested that a holistic view is taken of all the security, political, economic, social, and ethnic problems of the region and their linkages with the neighbouring countries. Otherwise, it will not be possible to tackle the serious situation that is developing in the Northeast. The strategy to solve the many issues should include: appropriate reforms in the constitution, political and legal institutions to accommodate the aspirations of the people. It should think in terms of cooperative federalism, decentralization and regional autonomy.
http://internalconflict.csa-chennai.org/2010/05/ethno-political-situation-in-indias.html
http://internalconflict.csa-chennai.org/2010/05/ethno-political-situation-in-indias.html